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One common objection to ethical vegetarianism concerns the morality of the predator-
prey relationship. According to some critics, ethical vegetarians fail to recognize that 
human beings are predatory animals (while not carnivores, at least omnivores), and that 
meat is a natural part of the human diet.  If it is natural for human beings to eat meat, 
how could it be wrong?  Related to this is the charge that ethical vegetarians are in the 
awkward position of condemning, not just human predation, but all forms of natural 
predation.  If we should interfere in the operations of the meat industry or abolish 
recreational hunting because of the misery which these practices inflict upon animals, 
shouldn’t we also interfere in the operations of nature and protect prey animals from 
wild predators?  The objection raised here is sometimes called the “predation 
argument.”  In what follows, I will examine three versions of the argument. 
 One version of the predation argument rests upon a comparison between human 
predation and predation in the wild.  For many people, there is no significant difference 
between what human beings do in eating meat and what natural predators do in killing 
prey for food.  Clearly, a wolf does nothing wrong in killing sheep for food, so why should it 
be wrong for human beings to eat meat?  As Kent Baldner writes, “If killing for food is 
morally justifiable for natural predators, the same should be true for human predators, 
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whether they are individual hunters or corporate factory farmers” (2).  Set forth as an 
argument, we have:  
 
 (1) It is morally acceptable for wild animals to kill prey. 
 (2) There is no significant difference between human predation and predation in 
the wild. 
Therefore: 
 
 (3) It is morally acceptable for human beings to kill animals for food. 
 
 Although this is a common objection to ethical vegetarianism, it is not terribly difficult to 
refute.  Is it plausible to maintain that whatever behavior is acceptable for wild animals is 
also acceptable for human beings?  This seems doubtful.  “It is odd,” Peter Singer once 
remarked, “how humans, who normally consider themselves so far above other animals, 
will, if it seems to support their dietary preferences, use an argument that implies that we 
ought to look to other animals for moral inspiration and guidance” (224).1  The problem 
concerns the second premise.  Many philosophers would argue that there are important 
moral differences between humans and other animals.  One difference is that humans are 
moral agents—that is, beings capable of understanding moral principles and guiding their 
conduct accordingly—whereas other animals (presumably) are not.  Animals lack the 
conceptual resources to form moral judgments about their behavior.  For this reason, it 
may be permissible for wolves to kill sheep for food, but not for human being to do so.  
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Wolves are not moral agents, whereas human beings are.  Because wolves are not moral 
agents, their behavior cannot be evaluated morally; but because human beings are moral 
agents, their actions can be evaluated morally. Therefore, behavior which is morally 
neutral for wolves, such as killing sheep, may be morally wrong for human beings.               
 A different response to the predation argument is suggested by Stephen Sapontzis.  
Rather than arguing that there are important moral differences between humans and other 
animals, Sapontzis suggests that the predatory practices of wild animals might be judged 
morally wrong even if these animals are not moral agents.  Consider the example of a 
small child—someone who is also not a moral agent—tormenting a cat.  Sapontzis writes: 
 
 The child may be too young to recognize and respond to humane moral 
obligations. However, while this may influence our evaluation of his/her 
character and responsibility for his/her actions, it does not lead us to 
conclude that there is nothing wrong with his/her tormenting the cat.  To take 
another example, if we determine that someone is criminally insane, i.e., is 
incapable of distinguishing right from wrong, this affects our evaluation of 
his/her responsibility for his/her actions and whether he/she deserves 
punishment for them. However, it does not lead us to conclude that there 
was nothing wrong with those actions (28). 
 
Sapontzis’s point is that whether or not someone is a moral agent is relevant to certain 
kinds of moral judgments, such as assignments of moral responsibility, but not to the moral 
 
1 All references to Singer’s work are to Animal Liberation, unless otherwise indicated.  
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evaluation of that person’s actions.  If a child torments a cat, what the child does is wrong 
whether or not the child realizes it or should be held accountable for her actions.  And if a 
cat torments a bird, this is wrong too whether or not the cat realizes it or should be held 
accountable for her actions.  The child and the cat simply don’t know any better, but this 
doesn’t render their actions morally neutral.  Similarly, a wolf who preys upon sheep may 
not know any better, but this doesn’t make the wolf’s actions morally neutral.  If Sapontzis 
is right, then, interestingly, it is not the second premise of the above argument which is 
suspect, but rather the first. 
    Let us now turn to a slightly different version of the argument.  Sometimes the predation 
argument is based upon a consideration of what is natural, and the morality of living 
according to one’s nature.  If human beings are by nature omnivores, how can it be wrong 
for them to eat meat?  Fully spelled out, we have the following argument:    
    
 (1) It is not wrong for natural predators to kill other animals for food. 
 (2) Human beings are natural predators (that is, meat eaters by nature). 
 
Therefore: 
  
 (3) It is not wrong for human beings to kill other animals for food.  
 
This version of the argument, unlike the first one, does not rest upon a comparison 
between human predation and predation in the wild.  Rather it rests upon the general 
moral principle, expressed in the first premise, that if an animal is by nature a meat eater—
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as, it is assumed, human beings are—then there is nothing wrong with that animal killing 
other animals for food.  This might be true even if there are important moral differences 
between human behavior and animal behavior.  So this version of the argument is not 
necessarily open to the same criticisms as the first one.  
 There are, however, grave problems with the general moral principle underlying this 
argument.  It is not uncommon to argue that if something is natural, it is morally 
acceptable, and this seems to be what supports the first premise of the argument.  Yet 
there is no obvious conceptual connection between natural behavior and morally correct 
behavior.  Viewed from a Darwinian perspective, what has shaped animal behavior 
throughout the long history of life on this planet is the contest for survival.  “Natural” 
behavior, in this sense, is simply whatever behavior is most successful in this competitive 
struggle, and this has nothing to do with promoting moral ideals.  Those forms of behavior 
which are most conducive to transmitting an animal’s genetic material to future 
generations are selected for, and those forms of behavior which are least conducive to this 
end are selected against.  For this reason there are many forms of behavior which are 
perfectly natural, yet quite deplorable when viewed from a moral standpoint.  It is, for 
example, “natural” for the strong to dominate the weak and for animals to engage in violent 
mating rituals.   Among human beings, perhaps even racism, sexism, war, and genocide 
are natural.  Yet no one would argue that these practices are morally unobjectionable.  
Living a moral life involves striving to bring about a better world, not simply conforming to 
the ways of nature.  Therefore, predation might be natural for many animals, including 
human beings, and yet be morally unacceptable.  If the world would be improved by a 
 Between the Species V August 2005 www.cla.calpoly.edu/bts/ 
6
reduction in suffering, and if predation contributes to the amount of suffering in the world, 
then, other things being equal, it would be better if predation did not occur. 
 There are other problems with the argument.  Although some philosophers, such as 
John Hill, argue that human beings possess both herbivorous and carnivorous 
characteristics, there are many reasons, rooted in our physiology and evolutionary past, 
for believing that humans are not true omnivores.  If we are not, then the second premise 
is false and the argument collapses.  Another objection has to do, not with the argument 
itself, but with its application to meat eating in America and other industrialized nations.  
No one could reasonably claim that the factory-farming methods employed in these 
countries are in any sense “natural.”  Therefore, it may in principle be permissible for 
human beings to use animals for food, but in actual practice, because of the methods 
employed in animal agriculture, it may still be wrong.  The argument seems to provide at 
best a defense of the subsistence hunting practices of hunter-gatherers, not of factory 
farming in industrialized nations.  Finally, it might be argued that predation is justifiable for 
human beings when morally preferable alternatives are unavailable, but not when they are 
available.  So, for instance, it might be acceptable for traditional Inuit to kill animals for 
food, since no alternatives exist, but it would not be permissible for Americans to do the 
same, since vegetarian alternatives are readily available.  
 Let us now turn to a very different version of the argument, what is sometimes called 
the “predation reductio.”  A reductio (more precisely, a reductio ad absurdum) is an 
argument which attempts to refute some position by “reducing it to absurdity”—that is, by 
deducing from it some absurd or ridiculous consequence.  The predation reductio is an 
argument which attempts to refute ethical vegetarianism by deducing from it an absurd 
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consequence involving the abolition of natural predation.  “Among the most disturbing 
implications drawn from conventional indiscriminate animal liberation/rights theory,” writes 
J. Baird Callicott, “is that, were it possible for us to do so, we ought to protect innocent 
vegetarian animals from their carnivourous predators” (258).  This charge, in one form or 
another, is often leveled against ethical vegetarianism.  Fully developed, the predation 
reductio proceeds as follows:  
  
 (1) Let us assume, along with the ethical vegetarian, that other animals are 
members of the moral community and, consequently, that there is a moral 
obligation to alleviate animal suffering and otherwise protect animals from 
harm.2
 (2) Wild predators harm prey animals.  
 
Therefore: 
 
 (3) If the ethical vegetarian is right, there is a moral obligation to prevent 
predation in the wild. 
 (4) But it is absurd to suppose that there is such an obligation. 
 
Therefore:  
2 This should be interpreted as a prima facie obligation.  In other words, the fact that an animal is threatened with 
harm constitutes a good moral reason—which may or may not be outweighed by other morally relevant 
considerations—for coming to that animal’s assistance.  (On the interpretation of moral principles adopted here, a 
moral principle does not express an exceptionless moral duty, but rather a moral reason for action.   If we have a 
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 (5) The ethical vegetarian is wrong—that is, other animals are not members of 
the moral community.  
 
 The moral principle lying behind this argument is the Good Samaritan Principle: if 
others are in need of assistance, and we are in a position to help, then we should.3  By 
“others” in this context is meant other members of the moral community.  According to the 
ethical vegetarian, this category includes a large class of nonhuman animals.  Hence, just 
as we should come to the assistance of a human being in need, we should come to the 
assistance of another animal equally in need.  Consider, for instance, what our reaction 
would be if another human being were attacked by a wild animal.  To stand by and do 
nothing would obviously be wrong.  We have a moral obligation to protect all members of 
the moral community from harm, whenever possible, whether this results from crime, 
accidents, disease, natural disasters, or wild animals.  Hence, we have an obligation to 
protect human beings from predators.  The problem, for the ethical vegetarian, is that if 
animals are members of the moral community, by parallel steps in reasoning, we reach the 
conclusion that prey animals should be protected from predators.  Yet how could anyone 
reasonably maintain that there is an obligation to abolish natural predation?  Since this 
conclusion is unacceptable, the assumption on which it rests is also unacceptable.  
Animals, in other words, are not members of the moral community.  
 
good moral reason for doing something, then we should act on that reason, if possible, unless we have better moral 
reasons for not doing so.  The right thing to do, in any situation, is to act according to the best moral reasons.)      
3 Again, this should be interpreted as a prima facie obligation.  If coming to the assistance of one person involved 
directly harming another, this would count as a good moral reason for not intervening.   This is certainly relevant to 
 Between the Species V August 2005 www.cla.calpoly.edu/bts/ 
9
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 Despite its apparent naiveté, the predation reductio cannot be easily dismissed, as 
many philosophers have tried to do.  “The short and simple answer,” writes Peter Singer, 
after raising the question of prey protection, “is that once we give up our claim to 
‘dominion’ over the other species we should stop interfering with them at all.  We should 
leave them alone as much as we possibly can.  Having given up the role of tyrant, we 
should not try to play God either” (226).  Yet this quick response is hardly consistent with 
Singer’s own claim that animal suffering is to be counted equally with human suffering.  If 
animals, no less than human beings, are members of the moral community, we are not 
“interfering” with them by protecting them from harm; rather we are responding to their 
needs and showing as much concern for their interests as for the interests of other human 
beings. 
 Singer admits that this short and simple answer is inadequate.  It is conceivable, he 
concedes, “that human interference will improve the conditions of animals, and so be 
justifiable.”  But, he goes on: 
 
Judging by our past record, any attempt to change ecological systems on a 
large scale is going to do far more harm than good.  For that reason, if for no 
other, it is true to say that, except in a few very limited cases, we cannot and 
should not try to police all of nature.  We do enough if we eliminate our own 
unnecessary killing and cruelty toward other animals (226).      
 
 
the question of prey protection.  To extend protection to prey animals might well involve condemning predatory 
animals to death by starvation. 
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Surely, Singer would not say that we “do enough” for other human beings if we eliminate 
our own unnecessary killing and cruelty toward them.4  So why is it that we do enough for 
other animals by refraining from these practices?  Why, in other words, should we 
intervene on behalf of other human beings, but simply leave other animals alone?  To be 
frank, Singer can’t say this.  For Singer, vegetarianism is a form of boycott undertaken for 
the purpose of ending the suffering of animals on factory farms.  By purchasing meat 
products, consumers do not themselves directly harm animals; rather this is done by the 
meat industry.  The obligation which consumers have to become vegetarians, therefore, is 
not based upon the obligation to refrain from harming animals, but upon the obligation to 
protect animals from harm.5  If we should protect animals from the harms inflicted by the 
meat industry, why should we not protect them from the harms inflicted by natural 
predators?  It may be true that by intervening on a large scale in the operations of nature 
we would do more harm than good; but from this it does not follow that we should do 
nothing, or intervene in only a “few very limited cases.”  This is black-and-white thinking.  
In any event, Singer’s response misses the point.  The important question is whether 
ethical vegetarianism entails a moral obligation to protect prey animals.  Even if this 
obligation is overridden by other considerations in most cases, the point of the predation 
reductio is that it is absurd to suppose that there is any such obligation to begin with.  If it is 
a consequence of Singer’s moral views that there is such an obligation, even one that is 
4 In Chapter 8 of Practical Ethics, for instance, Singer argues that rich nations should intervene to help end hunger 
in poor nations.  Those who die from hunger are not the targets of unnecessary killing and cruelty, but the victims of 
culpable neglect.       
5 This claim is debatable.  While it is true that consumers do not directly harm farm animals by purchasing meat 
products, it might be wondered whether they indirectly harm them.  I leave it to the reader to decide.  My point is 
that, for Singer, becoming a vegetarian is a way of preventing the cruelties inflicted upon animals by the meat 
industry, and is, in this sense, a way of protecting animals from harm.         
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usually overridden, then he must somehow dispel the apparent absurdity of this 
consequence.         
 Tom Regan approaches the problem in a different way, arguing that there is no 
obligation to prevent predation in the wild because wild predators are not moral agents 
and, therefore, cannot violate the rights of prey.  In The Case for Animal Rights, he writes: 
 
 Only moral agents can have duties, and this because only these individuals 
have the cognitive and other abilities necessary for being held morally 
accountable for what they do or fail to do.  Wolves are not moral agents.  
They cannot bring impartial reasons to bear on their decision making—
cannot, that is, apply the formal principle of justice or any of its normative 
interpretations.  That being so, wolves in particular and moral patients 
generally cannot themselves meaningfully be said to have duties to anyone, 
nor, therefore, the particular duty to respect the rights possessed by other 
animals.  In claiming that we have a prima facie duty to assist those animals 
whose rights are violated, therefore, we are not claiming that we have a duty 
to assist the sheep against the attack of the wolf, since the wolf neither can 
nor does violate anyone’s rights (285).  
 
It may or may not be true that wolves violate the rights of sheep, but surely this is not the 
only consideration relevant to deciding whether there is an obligation to protect sheep from 
wolves.  Again, consider what our reaction would be if a human being were attacked by a 
wild animal.  No one could reasonably argue that because a wild animal is not a moral 
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agent and cannot, therefore, violate anyone’s rights, this releases us from any obligation 
to come to that person’s assistance.  We have a moral obligation to protect all members of 
the moral community from harm, whenever possible, whether or not this harm comes from 
moral agents.  If sheep are members of the moral community, therefore, it would certainly 
seem to follow that there is an obligation to protect them from wolves, whether or not 
wolves violate their rights.     
 How might the vegetarian successfully counter the predation reductio?  One possibility 
is suggested by our discussion of Singer.  Perhaps the obligation to become a vegetarian 
is not based upon the obligation to protect animals from harm, but upon the obligation to 
protect them from unnecessary harm.  This points to an important distinction between 
animal agriculture and natural predation.  Whereas wild predators must kill other animals 
for food or else die from starvation, for the vast majority of people, meat is simply a luxury.  
If this is a morally significant difference, then it may not be obligatory to prevent natural 
predation even if it is obligatory to boycott the products of animal agriculture.  One serious 
shortcoming of this reply, however, is that it does not explain why we should still protect 
other human beings from predators, as presumably we should.  Human beings are not by 
nature at the top of the food chain.  Throughout most of human history (and even today in 
some parts of the world), human beings were the natural prey of large cats and other 
predators.  If animals, no less than human beings, are members of the moral community 
and deserving of our compassion, then we cannot consistently claim that we should 
protect humans but not animals from the ravages of predation.6
6 One way in which we might try to resolve this inconsistency is by arguing that human life (ordinarily) has greater 
value than animal life.   While we may not be able to choose between the life of a sheep and the life of a wolf (who 
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 The only remaining possibility, it seems, is to reject the fourth premise of the 
reductio—that is, to concede that ethical vegetarianism entails an obligation to prevent 
natural predation, but to deny the absurdity of this consequence. This, for example, is the 
position defended by Stephen Sapontzis and criticized by Kent Baldner.  Sapontzis argues 
that we are morally obligated to prevent predation in the wild, at least when doing so would 
not produce more suffering than it would prevent.  Baldner, arguing from the standpoint of 
a holistic ethic, claims that an obligation to prevent natural predation is morally absurd.  To 
suppose that predation is unacceptable, as Sapontzis does, implies that there is 
something morally repugnant about nature.  For Baldner, such a position is profoundly 
arrogant.     
 Without commenting further on the exchange between Sapontzis and Baldner, let us 
briefly examine the charge that the obligation to prevent natural predation is morally 
absurd.  What exactly does this mean?  There seem to be two possibilities.  First, it might 
mean that the obligation to protect prey animals from natural predators is inherently 
absurd, like the obligation to protect rocks from natural erosion, or to protect water from 
evaporation.  It simply makes no moral sense at all.  Second, it might mean that such an 
obligation, while morally meaningful, is nonetheless incompatible with our deepest moral 
convictions.  It should not surprise us that ethical holists, such as Baldner and Callicott, 
whose moral outlook is shaped by the land ethic of Aldo Leopold, would insist that the 
 
must eat sheep or other prey in order to survive), certainly we can choose between the life of a (normal) human 
being and the life of a wolf (or some other natural predator).  This might explain why we would not be inconsistent 
in protecting human beings from natural predators, but not other animals.  This is a plausible position, but consider 
the following imaginary case.  Suppose the earth was invaded by carnivorous aliens who could satisfy their 
nutritional needs only by consuming human flesh.  Suppose further that these aliens far surpassed human beings in 
intelligence, rationality, and so on, so that alien life was judged to have greater value than human life.  Would we, 
for this reason, have no obligation to protect human beings from these alien predators?                         
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obligation to protect prey animals from natural predators is morally absurd.  According to 
Leopold, “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the 
biotic community.  It is wrong when it tends otherwise” (224-5).  For Leopold, the suffering 
endured by prey animals is not in itself a good moral reason for interfering in the 
operations of nature.  It is the good of the whole community of life that has moral 
importance, not the good of any individual living being.  If the predator-prey relationship, in 
all its multifarious forms, contributes to the “integrity, stability, and beauty” of nature, as 
arguably it does, then, for Leopold, it should be preserved.  
 Is the obligation to protect prey animals morally absurd in either one of these senses?    
There are examples which suggest otherwise.  Consider an insect, known as 
cephenomyia trompe, whose larvae feed and grow in the nostrils of reindeer, slowing 
suffocating the animals to death.7  If such parasitism could be eliminated, without 
significant cost to ourselves, and without disturbing the balance of nature, should we do 
so?  While we might hesitate to interfere in the lifecycle of cephenomyia trompe, how can 
we not have compassion for an animal dying a slow death from suffocation?  Would it be 
inherently absurd, or incompatible with our deepest moral convictions, to suggest that 
reindeer should be spared this ordeal?  Clearly not.  The difference between protecting 
rocks from erosion and protecting animals from predation is that rocks do not suffer from 
erosion, whereas animals certainly do suffer from predation.  If animal suffering counts for 
something in the moral balance, then the fact that animals suffer from predation 
constitutes a good moral reason for preventing it, and one which we should act on, unless 
7 This example is discussed by Arne Naess in “Should We Try To Relieve Clear Cases of Extreme Suffering in 
Nature?”   
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other considerations weigh against this.  As Singer notes, there are reasons for 
supposing that any attempt to alter ecological systems on a large scale would do more 
harm than good.8  Still it is not inherently absurd to suppose that there is an obligation to 
protect animals from natural predators, even if this obligation has limited practical 
application.  Nor (except, perhaps, in the case of ethical holists) does it conflict with our 
deepest moral convictions.  If one of these convictions is that we should strive to reduce 
the amount of suffering in the world, then assisting prey animals, in some cases at least, is 
one way in which this might be accomplished.               
 
               
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Baldner, Kent.  “Realism and Respect,” Between the Species (Winter 1990: 1-7). 
Callicott, Baird.  “Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics: Back Together Again,” in Hargrove, Eugene 
(ed.).  The Animal Rights/Environmental Ethics Debate (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1992). 
Hill, John.  The Case for Vegetarianism: Philosophy for a Small Planet (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 
1996).   
Leopold, Aldo.  A Sand County Almanac (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). 
Naess, Arne.  “Should We Try To Relieve Clear Cases of Extreme Suffering in Nature?” (Pan Ecology, Vol. 6, 
no. 1, Winter 1991.) 
Sapontzis, Stephen.  “Predation,” Ethics and Animals (Vol. 5, 1984: 27-38). 
Singer, Peter.  Animal Liberation, Second Edition (New York: The New York Review of Books, 1990).  
__________.  Practical Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979.) 
Regan, Tom.  The Case for Animal Rights (California: University of California Press, 1983). 
 
 
 
 
8 Although Singer is not specific about these reasons, two are rather obvious.  First, as already noted, extending 
protection to prey animals would in all likelihood involve condemning an indefinite number of predators to death by 
starvation.  Second, successfully segregating predators from prey would require greatly restricting the freedom of 
these animals, and so diminish the quality of their lives.  An additional consideration is that the energy and resources 
invested in any large-scale effort to protect prey animals would almost certainly be better utilized in the preservation 
and restoration of wildlife habitats.  As a general policy, we do more good for animals by protecting them from 
human encroachment than by protecting them from natural predators.           
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